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Abstract 
 
 The ICT sectors of both South Korea and Japan developed rapidly, especially in 
developing high-speed, low priced broadband services. These networks can potentially provide 
both economies with new playgrounds for experimentation and innovation. Existing explanations 
of how these broadband networks and services were created tend to be confused and 
contradictory regarding 1) the roles played by the states, 2) the exact mechanisms of interaction 
between governments policies and programs, regulatory frameworks, and market dynamics, and 
3) the politics driving each of the state-market interactions.  
We find that differences in the institutional configurations of the two countries since the 
inception of their ICT sectors created a distinct set of political dynamics in each country. The 
initial telecom policy regimes of the two countries in their initial stages of liberalization were 
strikingly similar. However, the contrasting political dynamics drove Japan and Korea’s policy 
regimes along different trajectories. Driven by politicized conflicts and a series of negotiated 
compromises between the former incumbent and lead bureaucracy, Japan’s ICT sector 
underwent a regime shift, from which the market dynamics giving rise to broadband services 
developed. By contrast, Korea’s managed competition policy regime, once established, was 
stable and hierarchical, with a strong lead bureaucracy managing the sector and former 
incumbent, without significant political battles. The market dynamics in Korea, from which its 
broadband services developed, occurred within its existing policy regime without a shift 
comparable to that in Japan. Differences in the politics, stemming from initial institutional 
configurations and subsequent political bargains at key junctures drove the two regimes along 
different trajectories. 
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Introduction 
The rapid economic development of both Japan and South Korea (hereon, Korea) partly 
hinged on their success in developing lead sectors that became globally competitive. Light 
industries such as textiles were followed by heavy industries such as steel, autos, and then 
electronics and semiconductors. Much ink has been spilled in attempting to explain the two 
countries’ rapid growth, especially regarding the governments’ roles, their capacities, and their 
relationships to markets.1 Our inquiry is aimed at understanding the two countries’ rapid 
development of the latest lead sector – Information, Communications and Technology (ICT).  
In fact, ICT has been recognized worldwide as not only a lead sector, but a broadly  
transformative sector capable of driving productivity, innovation, and growth in a wide range of 
industries.2 While most advanced industrial countries have attempted to nurture their domestic 
ICT sectors, Japan and Korea are notable in their rapid and extensive deployment of broadband 
services. As we describe in the next section, neither country had broadband markets before 
1999,3 but by 2002, they were at the forefront of global price-performance and leaders in 
population penetration. Although the full potential contributions of broadband networks to the 
two countries’ international competitiveness have yet to be discovered, few countries would 
regard their rapid broadband penetration with anything less than envy.  
We find an analytical comparison between Japan and Korea’s broadband development 
especially useful because they are often considered to have shared key patterns of state-market 
interaction in their overall economic growth, at least for a significant time period, and regardless 
                                                 
1 For excellent overviews of the scholarship, see Noble (1989), Onis (1991), Wade (1992), and Woo-Cumings 
(1999). 
2 Cohen, et al. (2000).  
3 A variety of definitions for “broadband” exist, but we follow the OECD in refering to services that offer more than 
256Kbps downstream access. We also exclude ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), an alternative, slower 
technology than DSL, despite requiring fiber optic cables to the home. See OECD (2002), p.6. 
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of the precise conception the analyst chooses to use.4 Thus, in this paper we seek to understand 
and compare the exact manner in which the two governments interacted with their respective 
markets in the course of developing broadband networks and services, with special attention to 
the politics driving those interactions.  
 
Korea and Japan’s Rapid Development of Broadband  
From the late 1990s, the ICT sectors of Korea and Japan developed rapidly, propelling 
them to the forefront of advanced industrial nations in terms of high-speed landline and wireless 
Internet connectivity. Since the market dynamics, policies, and politics behind the landline and 
wireless segments of the sector differ considerably, despite their increasing convergence, in this 
paper we limit our focus to the area with perhaps the most spectacular, if not sudden growth – 
broadband services.  
As Martin Fransman points out, no existing measures of national performance in 
broadband are perfect. Of the most common measures, Korea far exceeds all other nations in 
terms of penetration, and Japan leads the world in terms of speed and price. 5  
Korea moved first, with the rapid growth of DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), a technology 
involving sending high frequency signals over existing copper telecommunications infrastructure. 
With consumers enjoying the cheapest prices in the world, Korea’s broadband penetration 
became the highest worldwide by 2001, where it has remained through the date of this 
publication. Considering that there was no market for broadband before 1998, the fact that 70 out 
of 100 households sported broadband subscriptions by 2002 is nothing short of astonishing (See 
                                                 
4 In addition to citations in footnote 1, see Cumings (1984). Conceptions include economic perspectives stressing 
export-led growth, import substitution with credible threats of removing protections, political economic conceptions 
of “developmental,” “non-liberal,” “coordinated market economies,” “network states,” et cetera.  
5 Fransman points to 1) availability, 2) penetration, 3) capacity/speed, 4) price, and he calls for the adoption of 5) 
quality of access, and 6) goodness of fit with the needs of users. (Fransman 2006: 7) 
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table 1, which shows penetration rate per 100 inhabitants, rather than households, due to data 
limitations).6 In the one year between 1999 and 2001, the number of DSL subscriptions in Korea 
rose from 97 thousand to 2.7 million, and cable modem subscriptions increased from 17 
thousand to 1.5 million.7  
 
Table 1: Broadband Penetration Rate per 100 Inhabitants 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 6/2005 
Korea 9.2 17.2 21.8 24.2 24.9 25.5 
Japan 0.2 2.2 6.1 10.7 15 16.4 
USA 2.3 4.5 6.9 9.7 13 14.5 
OECD 
average 1.27 2.9 4.9 7.3 10.3 11.8 
        Source: OECD 
 
Table 2: Broadband Subscriptions, Japan 1999-2005 (millions) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total 
broadband - 0.63 2.83 7.81 13.64 18.66 22.37 
Cable 
Internet 0.15 0.63 1.3 1.95 2.48 2.87 3.23 
DSL Lines <.01 0.01 1.52 5.65 10.27 13.33 14.48 
FTTH - - 0.07 0.42 1.45 2.43 4.64 
       Note: for FTTH, 2001-2003 indicate end of FY rather than calendar year 
       Sources: 1999-2003: OECD 2005, 2004-2005: MIC 
 
Table 3: Broadband Subscriptions, Korea 1999-2005 (millions) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total 
broadband - 3.92 8.14 10.4 11.61 12.17 12.46 
Cable 
Internet 0.17 1.56 2.94 3.55 3.94 4.24 4.15 
DSL Lines 0.97 2.35 5.18 5.66 6.57 6.72 6.42 
other - 0.01 0.03 1.18 1.09 1.21 1.88 
       Note: number for 2004 is one month after end FY 2004, 2005 is end of FY 2005 
       Sources: 1999-2003: OECD 2005, 2004: MIC, 2005: NCA 
 
 
Japan followed suit in the early 2000s. In 1999, when DSL was first introduced, Japan 
was one of the most expensive OECD counties for Internet access. However, penetration grew 
                                                 
6 NCA (2004:15) 
7 OECD (2002b) p.13. 
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rapidly after 2000, with DSL subscriptions between the end of December 2000 and June 2001 
increasing by over 4000 percent.8 By 2002, Japan had the lowest prices for DSL in the world, as 
well as a market for FTTH (Fiber-to-the Home) services, high-speed fiber optic lines connected 
directly to households. FTTH services, offering transmission speeds of up to 100 Mbps (several 
times that of DSL) gave Japan the fastest household broadband networks worldwide. 9 By the 
end of 2005, over 44 percent of households had broadband access, and at the end of 2004, the 
ITU ranked Japan third in the number of total broadband subscribers.10 Thus, by 2004, after a 
period of extremely rapid growth, Korea and Japan’s broadband networks were at the forefront 
of broadband price-performance (see table 2). 11   
 
Table 4: Comparison of Prices per 100kbps, as of July 2003 
 
Country US$ 
Japan 0.09 
Korea 0.25 
Belgium 1.15 
Hong Kong 1.27 
Singapore 2.21 
New Zealand 2.71 
China 3.07 
Canada 3.25 
Netherlands 3.36 
US 3.53 
Germany 4.42 
 Source: MIC 2004 
 
                                                 
8 OECD (2002b: 14) 
9 DSL services in Japan ranged from 1 to 8 mbps in 2001, though they increased to 50 by 2003. See IICP (2005) for 
details on transmission speed increases.  The OECD figures on penetration per 100 inhabitants do not capture the 
rapid increases in speed, which are a critical characteristic differentiating the Japan from the US, with roughly 
similar penetration proportions.  
10 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. Information and Communication Economy Office, 
Information and Communications Policy Bureau. Main Data on Information and Communications in Japan. 
<http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho_tsusin/eng/main_data.html> Accessed 6/2/2006 
11 In addition, by 2004, Japan and Korea had the cheapest cost for 100kbit/s as a percentage of monthly income. 
(ITU 2004: 25)   
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Governments, Markets, and Development in Korea and Japan – Expectations  
Our interest in understanding how and why Korea and Japan’s broadband networks 
developed so rapidly thrusts us into an ongoing theoretical debate regarding the role of 
governments and markets. Given that the rapid developments occurred after Korea’s financial 
crisis and Japan’s decade-long stagnation, how exactly did the governments and markets interact 
to produce these outcomes? How similar were Japan and Korea’s roles of the governments and 
markets in their development of broadband? What were the politics driving each of the 
governments, and how do they compare to one another?  
Theoretical debates over whether Japan and Korea’s overall economic development were 
primarily due to market-led or state-led forces have been hashed out extensively. In applying 
these theoretical positions to broadband development, let it suffice to say that support can be 
found for both expectations – markets and technological developments affecting policy choices, 
as well as government actions shaping markets.12 Our position is that both Japan and Korea’s 
government were strategic in their liberalization of markets surrounding broadband.13 By 
strategic, we mean that they had concrete goals in mind, and were capable of channeling policy 
and institutional change towards those goals. However, we are careful to recognize that the 
governments were far from omniscient nor monolithic; they were sometimes taken by surprise 
                                                 
12 See Appendix for a more detailed treatment of the market-led and state-led expectations that grow out of these 
debates.  
13 The intellectual antecedents of our study are the following works of scholarship. Following Karl Polanyi, who 
recognized that markets must be created and sustained by continuous government intervention, we expect the 
government to play a strong role in shaping the actors and terms of competition (Polanyi 1944). Taking after Steven 
Vogel’s analysis of liberalization in advanced industrial democracies, we also expect that liberalization, an increase 
in the level of competition, can be accomplished through both deregulation, a relaxing of rules, as well as re-
regulation, a strengthening of rules (Vogel 1996). Influenced by Suzanne Berger, who pointed out that institutions 
can shape politics, and John Zysman, who argued that the strategies available to governments were influenced by the 
architecture of their financial systems, we expect the interaction of institutions and politics in the ICT sector to 
influence the strategies taken by governments. Berger (1972) esp 145-177, Zysman (1983). 
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by actual market developments, and political processes interacted with bureaucratic 
policymaking.  
Existing analyses of the two countries’ broadband development provide a confusing and 
contradictory picture, since they tend to contain the logic of either the market-led or government-
led analysis, which essentially predict the opposite role of the state – withdrawing from markets, 
or actively intervening in them. Worse yet, some embed both within a single explanation.14 
Empirically, the market-led explanations tend to ignore bountiful examples of re-regulation, 
while state-led explanations tend to list government programs and outcomes with little regard for 
market dynamics. Both tend to downplay the political dynamics driving policies and regulatory 
regimes, an aspect we view as critical to understanding changes in policies, and the trajectories 
of such change. Therefore, neither can understand the precise nature of interaction between the 
governments and markets over time, nor can they accurately characterize the similarities and 
differences between Korea and Japan’s broadband development.  
 In this paper, we closely examine the interaction between the governments and markets in 
the development of Korea and Japan’s broadband services markets, focusing on the politics and 
institutional configurations that drive government policies and institutional change.  
 
The Argument in Brief 
 We find that differences in the institutional configuration of the two countries since the 
inception of their ICT sectors created a distinct set of political dynamics in each country.15 The 
initial telecom policy regimes – the set of institutions and policies that provide incentives and 
                                                 
14 Tcha et al (2000), Lee (2002), Choudrie and Lee (2004), OECD (2000), are the most clear examples of this 
conflation. Fransman (2006), which appeared in print after we finished this manuscript, is perhaps the most even-
handed account we have seen, splitting the credit between market and governmental factors. Chung (2006) in 
Fransman’s volume, lists all possible contributory factors for Korea without a clear causal argument.  
15 In this paper we take a relatively narrow definition of institutions, referring to formal government organizations.  
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constraints for firms in determining their strategies – of the two countries in their initial stages of 
liberalization were strikingly similar, with a lead bureaucracy in each country closely 
micromanaging the telecom markets. However, the contrasting political dynamics drove Japan 
and Korea’s policy regimes along different trajectories. Driven by politicized conflicts and a 
series of negotiated compromises between the former incumbent and lead bureaucracy, Japan’s 
ICT sector underwent a “regime shift,” from which the market dynamics giving rise to 
broadband services developed. By contrast, Korea’s “managed competition” policy regime, once 
established, was stable and hierarchical, with a strong lead bureaucracy managing the sector and 
former incumbent, without significant political battles. The market dynamics in Korea, from 
which its broadband services developed, occurred within its existing policy regime without a 
shift comparable to that of Japan. Differences in the politics, stemming from initial institutional 
configurations and subsequent political bargains at key junctures drove the two regimes along 
different trajectories. 
In both cases, however, we find that the market-led and state-led expectations are not 
entirely wrong, but are limited in their applicability to the entire sector. We argue that both 
governments engaged in deregulation as well as re-regulation in particular segments of the 
sector, in a strategic attempt to facilitate broadband networks. Japan did so in the context of a 
regime shift, while Korea did so within its existing policy regime.  
 
Institutional Origins and Political Dynamics: Privatization and Liberalization 
 
 The telecom sectors of both Japan and Korea began under the auspices of direct 
government ownership and operation. The next step for both countries was to set up a monopoly 
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corporation as the state-owned carrier – NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) for Japan and 
KTA (Korea Telecommunication Authority) for Korea – a typical step for many industrialized 
countries other than the US.16 Then, a combination of international, domestic, and technological 
developments sparked Japan and Korea’s political process of privatizing their monopoly carriers 
and liberalizing the sector. International events included the privatization and breakup of AT&T 
in the US and the wave of liberalization and privatization across the world in the 1980s. 
Domestic developments included the completion of their respective national telephony 
infrastructures, and technological developments included value-added networks linking 
computers via telecom infrastructure. 
 The political dynamics of privatization and liberalization differed between the two 
countries. Japan’s privatization of NTT, coinciding with liberalization measures, was a 
politically messy affair involving a reconfiguration of power between institutional actors. In 
contrast, Korea’s privatization was a relatively smooth process, followed by a politically driven 
initiative to strengthen the lead bureaucracy. These differences were driven by the initial 
institutional configurations of the telecom sectors in the two countries, and the ensuing political 
dynamics that developed.  
 
Japan: the Political Battle Creating MPT as a “Policy Bureaucracy”  
 In Japan, the political battle over privatizing NTT and beginning to liberalize the sector 
was complex and contentious, involving a dramatic power grab by the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT).  
                                                 
16 For most countries, the massive, coordinated infrastructure investment requirement made direct state ownership 
attractive, and the economies of scale in the business made a monopoly structure the logical choice.  
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In 1889, the Japanese government established the Ministry of Communications (MoC) as 
the owner and operator of Japan’s telecommunications networks. Due to its involvement in 
propaganda during the war, the MoC was disbanded by the Allied Occupation government. In 
1952, after political wrangling over the form it would take, the telecom functions of MoC were 
transferred to NTT, newly established as a public corporation. NTT then proceeded to become 
the dominant actor in telecom sector until the 1980s.17 For example, though formally under the 
jurisdiction of MPT, NTT was able to essentially regulate itself for a number of reasons. First, 
MPT, which had been created from the Ministry of Postal Affairs, lacked expertise to effectively 
regulate NTT. Since NTT had been the prewar Ministry of Communications, MPT often lacked 
the staff with proper expertise in communications technology, leading to a situation in which 
NTT personnel sent to MPT were in charge of approving NTT’s requests.18 NTT also received 
budget allocations from the Diet, and MPT did not have the array of policy tools related to 
funding allocations enjoyed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) or Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI). NTT also used its substantial R&D budget to keep a set of equipment 
suppliers, the “NTT family,” including firms such as NEC, Fujitsu, and Oki, to supply equipment 
tailored to its specifications.19  
The battle over NTT’s privatization was fought among actors including the Second 
Administrative Reform Commission (Rincho), MPT, NTT, the Ministry of Finance, NTT 
“family” firms, retired NTT executives, NTT’s union (Zendentsu), and several key LDP (Liberal 
Democratic Party) politicians. This battle was closely intertwined with a bureaucratic turf war 
between MITI and MPT over jurisdiction of the rapidly expanding telecom sector. This turf war 
                                                 
17 For details on the early political and market dynamics of Japan’s telecom sector, see Vogel (1996), esp. pp 137-
145, Johnson (1989), Anchordoguy (2001), and Fransman (1995).   
18 Johnson (1989), p.190  
19 For details on the dynamics between NTT “family” firms and NTT, see Anchordoguy (2001), Fransman (1995).  
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involved many of the same political actors, with MPT leaning heavily on policy specialist 
politicians from the ruling LDP party (known as zoku politicians), with MITI attempting to bring 
the US into the policy debate on its side through American trade policy interests. Details of the 
battle have been documented elsewhere, but in short, the outcome was a dramatic gain in 
regulatory authority and policymaking power by MPT.20  
MPT succeeded in rising from a “regulatory” bureaucracy with largely nominal power, to 
a full-fledged “policy” bureaucracy capable of MITI-style industrial policy. In a regulatory 
regime labeled by Vogel as “controlled competition,” MPT compartmentalized the sector, 
orchestrated competitors, and used extensive licensing authority over matters such as pricing to 
micromanage competition.  
 Put simply, the outcomes of privatization and initial liberalization were somewhat of a 
reversal in MPT and NTT’s power relations. NTT had escaped the fate of AT&T, which had 
been completely broken apart, but much of the regulatory oversight was transferred from the 
Diet to MPT. This outcome set up the political dynamics that drove Japan’s telecom 
policymaking thereafter. MPT, as the lead bureaucracy, attempted to exert its will over NTT 
through different sets of policies, and unambiguously calling for a complete breakup of NTT 
when the issue arose in 1990, and again in 1996. NTT resisted, at times mustering political 
support within the LDP to compromise with MPT and soften its proposed measures.21  
 
 
                                                 
20 For detailed accounts of the political battles, see Vogel (1994), Johnson (1989), Takano (1992), and for a longer 
overview, see Kushida (2005). 
21 For details on such policy battles, see Kawabata (2004), esp pp. 32-34.  
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Chart 1: The Evolution of Japan’s Lead Bureaucracy and Incumbent 
 
Prewar  Postwar - 1985  1985 - Present (2006) 
Ministry of 
Communications (MOC) 
? NTT Public corp ? NTT (NTT Holding Company after 1999) 
     
Ministry of Postal Affairs ? MPT (administrative 
bureaucracy) 
? MPT (policy bureaucracy) 
 
Korea: Hierarchy and The Creation of a Strong Lead Bureaucracy 
 In Korea, the Ministry of Communications (MOC) was the bureaucracy that directly 
operated telecom services from 1948 until 1981. In 1981, as in Japan, telecom services were 
spun out into a state-owned monopoly carrier, KTA. However, unlike the case of Japan, KTA 
did not have the type of policymaking clout or supplier relations that NTT had enjoyed. MOC 
had real power and oversight over KTA, which facilitated a smooth privatization process.  
 The government decided to privatize KTA in July 1987 with little political resistence, and 
spent a decade slowly divesting itself from the company while it introduced competition into the 
sector. Along the way, key political actors supported increasing privatization and liberalization, 
including Presidents Roh Taewoo (1987-1993) and Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998), the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE), and the industrial 
conglomerates, chaebol, made the process relatively free of conflict.  The main political bargain 
during the privatization process was between the government and KTA’s labor union, which 
agreed to the privatization on the condition that KTA would not be sold to chaebol or foreign 
interests, in order to assure stable employment.22  In 1997, the government abolished the KT law 
that had governed KTA’s activities, and they renamed it Korea Telecom (KT). By 2000, they had 
fully privatized the company.   
                                                 
22 For each actor’s preferences and strategies in privatizing KTA, see Bae and Chu (2003) and Sung et al. (2005). 
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 Although the privatization process was relatively smooth, some conflict between 
bureaucracies did occur over the issue of liberalization, regarding how to introduce competition 
into the sector. Though not as extreme as the politicized turf war between Japan’s MPT and 
MITI, there was some cleavage in the early 1980s between bureaucrats who preferred market-led 
liberalization and those who envisioned state leadership in high-tech industries. The cleavage 
developed into bureaucratic conflicts between the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 
(MoTIE), and Korea’s MoC, with further policy coordination difficulties caused by software 
industrial policy being under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MST).23  
In 1994, a politically driven focus on IT development by the Korean political leadership 
strengthened the lead bureaucracy for telecom policymaking.24 In an administrative reform drive 
to coordinate high-tech policy, the Kim Young-Sam administration expanded the power, 
jurisdiction, and functions of MOC, creating the Ministry of Information and Communications 
(MIC). MIC was given sole responsibility for the IT sector, absorbing the industrial policy 
functions from MoTIE and MST. A series of politically driven policies – the “Framework Act on 
Informatization Promotion” in 1995, and an “Information Promotion Fund” in 1996 – 
strengthened MIC’s legal and financial tools to guide IT policy. Another difference between 
Japan’s MPT and Korea’s MIC was that the Minister of MIC, appointed by the president, were 
always distinguished experts in IT, facilitating decisive policymaking and strengthening the 
legitimacy of MIC’s policies. The contrast with Japan is clear, since the Ministers of Japan’s 
                                                 
23 For details, see Hong (1998). 
24 For details on the bureaucratic conflicts and establishment of MIC, see Hong (1998). 
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MPT tended to be politicians serving their rotation in Cabinet positions, with the real power 
often residing in the top bureaucrats.25  
 Thus, the initial institutional arrangements differed between the two countries, which 
shaped the actors responsible for driving political dynamics at key junctures. Despite these 
differences in the politics of telecom policymaking, however, the policy regimes that each 
country developed during the course of their liberalization converged to a remarkable degree.  
Chart 2: The Evolution of Korea’s Lead Bureaucracy and Incumbent 
? MOC (1981 - 1994) ? MIC (1994 - Present ) Ministry of Communications 
(MOC) 
(1948-1981) 
 
? 
 
KTA (1981 - 1997) 
 
?
 
KT (1997 - Present) 
 
The Regulatory Frameworks: “Managed Competition” Regimes  
 The regulatory regimes of Japan and Korea resembled each other quite closely in the first 
phases of liberalization. We conceptualize regulatory regimes as the policies, regulations, and 
institutions that shape the terms of market competition and private actors’ incentives and 
constraints. Both had a strong lead bureaucracy that compartmentalized the sector, orchestrated 
new competitors, and micromanaged the terms of competition. In short, the regulatory regimes of 
both countries were geared towards “managing” competition.  
                                                 
25 The first minister of MIC in 1994 was Mr. Sang-Hyon Kyong. He received a B.A. from Seoul National 
University, a B.S. from University of Rhode Island and a Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
all in engineering. Between 1965 and 1975, he was on the technical staff at Argonne National Laboratory, Bell 
Laboratories, and at Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) of Korea. Before serving 
as the minister, he was a Vice President of Korea Telecom, the President of ETRI and National 
Computerization Agency (NCA), and vice minister of MOC . 
The most recent minister was Mr. Dae-Je Chin who earned a B.A./ M.A. at Seoul National University, another 
M.A. at the University of Massachusetts, and a Ph. D at Stanford, all in electronic engineering. He began as an 
engineer at Hewlett- Packard 's lab and IBM's Watson Research Center. Prior to being named to head the 
Ministry, he served as the President and CEO of Samsung Electronics' Digital Media Network Business. In his 
long career at Samsung, he served in a series of increasingly important positions in several Samsung business 
units including: vice president of Memory Business; senior vice president of Semiconductor Business; 
executive vice president of System LSI Business; president & CTO of Corporate R&D Center; and president 
of Digital Media Network Business. In recognition of his many achievements in industry, he was named the 
Techno CEO of 2002 by the Ministry of Science & Technology. He has 6 overseas patents and 15 domestic 
patents.  
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 In Japan, the Telecommunications Business Law governing the sector allowed MPT to 
divide carriers into three types based on whether they owned or leased infrastructure, and to 
exercise more control over carriers possessing infrastructure.26 MPT also used administrative 
guidance to limit the scope of businesses to long distance, local, or international.27 MPT 
exercised discretionary authority in allowing new competitors into the sector through a “Supply 
Demand Adjustment” clause in the Telecommunications Business Law. The clause enabled them 
to deny market entry to firms by citing excess supply or insufficient potential demand, without 
offering specific criteria. Interconnection rates charged to competitors for accessing NTT’s 
infrastructure were arbitrated by MPT behind closed door negotiations in contentious annual 
negotiations between NTT and its competitors. MPT also managed prices set by carriers through 
its licensing authority, carefully weighing the expected effect of price change proposals by 
competitors and NTT on the competitive landscape before giving approval. Prices therefore 
came down gradually, and in lock-step, with competitors lowing their prices incrementally, 
followed closely by NTT.28  
 Korea’s regulatory regime from the late 1980s was extremely similar. It also had a 
Telecommunications Business Law, and in 1990, the government compartmentalized the sector 
by dividing services into “facilities-bases” and “value-added” services, and creating a number of 
categories for service providers. 29 They also divided the sector along the lines of international, 
                                                 
26 “Type I” carriers owned infrastructure and consisted of NTT and the NCCs. “Type II” carriers leased facilities 
from Type I carriers. “Special Type II” carriers could provide services across prefectures, while General Type II 
carriers limited their operations to local areas.  
27 Fuke (2000) 
28 For details, see Kushida (2005), (2006), Fuke (2000), Vogel (1996). 
29 The government re-categorized the service provides three times over the course of the 1990s. See Lee and Lie 
(2000) for details on how the categories for service providers shifted from “General,” “Specific,” and “Value-added” 
in 1990 to “Facility-based” and “Value-added, in 1994, and “Facility-based,” “Special” and “Value-added” in 1997.  
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long-distance, and domestic, progressively licensing competitors in each sector over time.30 
Between 1990 and 1994, the government generally permitted only services that it had approved 
(a “positive listing” system), and in issuing new licenses, until 1997 it only accepted applications 
during a particular window of time allotted by the government (a “request for proposal” 
system).31  
 In sum, let us note that the liberalization processes of both countries entailed increasing 
the level of competition not simply by deregulation, but re-regulation – the creation of new rules 
and institutions. Both governments used their policy tools to actively manage the dynamics of 
market competition in their telecom sectors.  
 
The Interaction Between Markets and Regulatory Regimes in Emerging Broadband 
Markets 
 So far, we have seen how the political dynamics of privatization between the two 
countries differed, though their regulatory regimes during the process of liberalization were quite 
similar. Here we closely examine the interactions between politics, regulatory regimes, and 
market dynamics during the advent of broadband markets. We examine Korea first, since it was 
first in developing broadband markets, and we find that broadband developed within its existing 
“managed competition” regulatory regime. We then examine the case of Japan, which reveals 
that in contrast to Korea, it underwent a “regime shift,” and that broadband markets grew out of 
this process. We argue that differences in politics driving telecom policymaking are likely to be 
the root of the divergence in their regulatory regimes.  
                                                 
30 In 1990, the government licensed DACOM (Datacommunications company of Korea) to International service, and 
in 1995 for long distance. In 1996, they licensed addition competition for international services, which Onsei took 
advantage of, doing likewise for long distance in 1997. In 1996, the government licensed a competitor to domestic 
telephony, Hanaro.  
31 For details, see Lee and Lie (2000). 
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Broadband in Korea: From the Managed Competition Regime 
 The Korean government did not orchestrate broadband deployment from a master 
blueprint to reshape its IT infrastructure. However, its policies strongly shaped the strategies 
taken by service providers and the service providers themselves. The “facilities-based” 
competition, in which different service providers competed with one another using separate sets 
of infrastructure, was the government’s desire from the beginning.  
 In order to foster network infrastructure buildouts, MIC began using its newly acquired 
resources and policy tools. In 1995, it began the Korea Information Korea Information 
Infrastructure Initiative (KII; 1995-2005), which included in a variety of backbone building and 
R&D facilitation programs.32 In order to directly foster facilities-based competition, MIC offered 
financial support, granting preferential tax treatment and directly underwrote loans to service 
providers building their networks.33 
 Broadband service began in Korea in 1998, when Thrunet introduced broadband services 
over its cable infrastructure. After the government announced that it would issue a license to one 
firm to lease out cable infrastructure, Thrunet was created in 1996 as a consortium of over one 
hundred companies, under the auspices of Dacom (Datacommmunications company of Korea), 
the long distance competitor to KT which had entered the market in 1995.  The principal 
shareholder turned out to be state-owned energy company KEPCO (Korea Electric Power 
Company), and when Thrunet began its service, it used its own service and leased additional 
                                                 
32 KII consisted of three parts: “KII-Government” built a nationwide backbone for broadband, “KII-Testbed” 
supported R&D to bring technologies to market, and “KII-Private” aimed to facilitate market competition in 
such a way that it would bring broadband networks to large buildings and households through private sector 
investment. See Lee and Chan-Olmsted (2004), pp. 658-659.  
33 Other financial support went to R&D, technology demonstration projects, pilot programs and community 
champions. For details, see Lee et al. (2004).  
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infrastructure from KEPCO. Incidentally, KEPCO had made a bold gamble to build its own fiber 
optic infrastructure without explicit government permission.34 The broadband service became 
quite popular among the Korean public, impatient with the slow connection speed of dial-up 
services.  
 The entrance of a startup firm, Hanaro, into the broadband market is usually considered 
the beginning of Korea’s broadband explosion. Hanaro was formed in 1997, after MIC’s 
announcement in 1996 that it would license exactly one competitor into the local telephony 
market. Dacom, KEPCO, and chaebol such as Samsung, LG, and Daewoo were initial investors, 
and Shin Yun-Shik, former vice minister of MPT and top management of Dacom, was one of the 
initial leaders. In an attempt to create a relatively even playing field, MIC created a new set of 
regulations that prohibited KT from subsidizing its local service with profits derived from its 
long distance or international operations.35  
 Upon entering the local telephony services market, however, Hanaro quickly found that 
competing against KT was tantamount to taking on Goliath bare-handed. KT was able to offer 
high quality services for competitive prices, and the lack of number portability caused Hanaro to 
face network effects (consumers facing switching costs, keeping them in KT’s service). Driven 
                                                 
34 According to the following account by prominent government official, the story behind KEPCO’s ownership 
of an extensive high-speed communications infrastructure serves as a check against the temptation to assign 
too much foresight and omnipotence to the Korean government in its creation of the market environment from 
which broadband developed. In around 1980, KEPCO installed fiber optic cables throughout its network, 
gambling that once it had the infrastructure, the government would have no choice but to allow KEPCO to use 
it more productively. This was interesting, given that KEPCO was fully government-owned and under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). In the meantime, KT had its own incentive to 
create fiber optic networks, and the government supported their build-out, partly through financial incentives. 
A dispute ensued when both KEPCO and KT applied for a license to lease fiber to telecom carriers. From a 
capacity standpoint, according to the government official, KT’s infrastructure was sufficient, and KEPCO’s 
was redundant. However, both KT and KEPCO were fully government owned at the time, and although MOC 
was pitted against MCI, they could not engage in a public battle, since public disclosure would have revealed 
that MCI had allowed KEPCO to take matters into its own hands with taxpayers’ money. 
35 Although the revenue often flows the opposite direction, with local service subsidizing long distance when 
incumbents face competition in long distance services, a former top government official asserts that the 
government wanted to ensure that flow of revenue within KT would be segmented in each market. Interview 
with former top MIC official (November 4, 2005). 
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to desperation, Hanaro noted that its customer surveys revealed that KT’s data service 
subscribers (including Internet services based on dial-up and ISDN – Integrated Services Digital 
Network) lodged many complaints, mainly that access was slow and access fees were charged by 
the minute. DSL technology, which utilized existing copper infrastructure, delivered higher 
speed, and could be offered at flat rate fees, provided an opportunity Hanaro could not pass up. 
 The regulatory framework supported Hanaro’s strategy to begin offering DSL, since 
Internet service provision was in a relatively unregulated segment of the market, requiring 
neither permission nor licensing.36 Furthermore, in 1997 the government had switched from a 
“positive list” system, allowing only government-specified activities by service providers, to a 
“negative list” system, in which service providers could provide any service except government-
prohibited ones.  
Thus, in April 1999 Hanaro began offering broadband services utilizing both DSL and 
cable, using its own DSL network, and leasing cable capacity from a subsidiary of KEPCO 
(called Powercomm) and KT.37 With its entry into broadband service, Hanaro sparked intense 
competition and created a price shock by providing the broadband service as a free addition to its 
basic telephone subscription which amounted to $40 with free installation. This price shock 
aided Hanaro in successfully gaining more than a million subscribers within 18 months of 
introducing its DSL service. 
                                                 
36 It was classified as a value-added service, for Facilities-based Service Providers (FSPs). 
37 In cable service, the Korean government required structural separation of conduit and content, the two state-
owned cable infrastructure owners of Powercomm and KT were not permitted to offer services, but instead 
leased capacity to programmers. Therefore, new entrants to the broadband market, such as Thrunet in 1998 and 
Hanaro in 1999, initially leased cable capacity to reach their earliest customers. This structural separation rules 
in cable were relaxed in 2000 when KT sold its cable infrastructure to cable service providers.  
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Hanaro’s jaw-dropping DSL success profoundly influenced the strategy of KT, the 
dominant incumbent carrier.38 Unlike NTT, KT had only begun investing in ISDN. It quickly 
scrapped plans for further investments in ISDN and put its weight behind DSL, since users 
clearly preferred its higher speed, flat-rate low subscription price, and always-on Internet 
access.39 Fearing that it would be permanently left behind if it did not commence broadband 
service, KT started ADSL service in June 1999. Competition further heated up when other firms, 
including SK Telecom in 1999 and Onse Telecom in 2000, also entered the market. 
Once it entered the market, however, KT’s status as the incumbent with nationwide 
telephony infrastructure allowed it to quickly offer DSL service throughout the nation (Hanaro 
was limited in its geographic reach). KT’s competitive pricing and rising demand for broadband 
enabled it to quickly catch up and surpass Hanaro’s market share by June 2000, retaining a 
dominant market share since. Tables 4 and 5 shows its dramatic gain in market share – from 5 
percent in 1999 to 44 percent in 2000. With DSL being in a relatively unregulated market 
segment, KT did not face policies designed to aid competitors at its expense. The smaller service 
providers never had a chance. 
 
Table 5: Total Subscribers of Broadband Carriers  
Year 1999 2000 2001 
Thrunet 142,168 760,999 1,317,624 
Hanaro 84,249 1,056,724 2,070,552 
KT 12,903 1,730,977 3,874,442 
Others 13,662 394,300 580,382 
Total 252,982 3,943,000 7,843,000 
             Adapted from Lee (2003) 
 
                                                 
38 We refer KTA as KT (Korea Telecom), because KTA was renamed as KT in December 2001. 
39 As a clear indication of consumer preference, in 1999, there were about 175 thousand ISDN subscribers, with 97 
thousand DSL subscribers in Korea. However, in 2000, the number of ISDN subscribers had shrunk to 100 thousand, 
while DSL grew to over two million. (OECD 2005) 
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Table 6: Market Shares of Broadband Carriers (%) 
 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Thrunet 56  19  17  13  12 10 
Hanaro 33  27  26  28  25 23 
KT 5  44  49  47  50 55 
Others 5  10  7  13  14 11 
   Source: Lee (2003) and MIC (2005) 
 
Industrial Policy with a Twist 
 Notable about Korea’s industrial policies towards broadband, within its strategic 
liberalization drive, is its attempt to not only enhance supply-side investment in networks, but to 
promote demand for their use as well. In its classical developmental strategy, Korea is usually 
considered to have been producer rather than consumer-oriented, channeling peoples’ income 
into relatively centralized banking systems by keeping individual access to other avenues of 
investment such as securities or offshore markets relatively difficult, and then channeling those 
savings into strategic sectors. The KII strategies fall in the line of this classical industrial policy.  
 However, in promoting broadband and the Internet, the Korean government enacted a 
series of demand magnification programs. Several programs were designed to facilitate Internet 
education, computer use in schools, homes, to offer computer purchase assistance, and even to 
educate housewives, who tend to control household finances.40 Perhaps the most clever demand 
magnification policy to was to deeply embed computer literacy in Korea’s ultra-competitive 
                                                 
40 Programs include the “Ten Million People Internet Education Project (2000-2002)” to provide Internet education 
to approximately a fourth of citizens and “One Million Housewife Digital Literacy Education Project.” In terms of 
Internet access to schools, the government offered discounts for the provision of Internet access in primary and 
secondary schools under a special agreement with KT, leading to 100% penetration of schools with broadband by 
the end of 2000, though of course how it is used is another matter. (Choudrie and Lee (2004), p. 107.) In terms of 
PC diffusion promotion, from October 1999, the “PC for everyone” program aimed to provide PCs at low-prices, 
partly through a PC purchase installment saving system using the postal savings system. The Korean government 
also provided subsidies for purchase of PC by low-income citizens. In 2000, the government itself purchased 50,000 
PCs as a four-year lease, providing it to low-income families with full support for broadband fee for five years. MIC 
(2001).  With respect to housewives, government subsidies were granted to around 1,000 private training institutes 
over the nation for the purpose of education housewives, in order to create demand in households. MIC (2001). 
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university entrance exams, making a home PC a prerequisite for any serious education-minded 
parent, of which there is no shortage as evidenced by the extensive cram school industry. 
Broadband access became part of the package of computer literacy, driving sales for households 
with school-age children.41 While the effectiveness of these programs and policies in promoting 
broadband cannot be determined decisively, it is noteworthy that the government adopted a range 
of demand magnification industrial policies in addition to the usual supply-side facilitation 
measures.  
 
Re-Regulation: Managed Competition, Continued 
 If there was any doubt whether market developments in Korea’s broadband services were 
an indication of government retreat, re-regulation by MIC in 2004 is strong evidence that the 
government sees its role primarily as facilitating competition, keeping the existing regulatory 
framework intact.  
 After the initial burst of growth, and after KT entered the broadband market, competing 
broadband providers began to run into financial difficulties. In 2002, Thrunet declared 
bankruptcy, and Hanaro found it increasingly difficult to sustain profitability.42 Seeing this 
situation and deeming KT’s dominance as a barrier to competition, in 2004 MIC stepped in to 
strengthen regulations in the broadband market. By shifting the categorization of broadband 
service providers from a less regulated segment (“value-added”) to a more regulated segment 
                                                 
41 Aizu (2002) provides a nice overview of how computer literacy as an investment in education plugged into the 
“education fever” caused by the rigorous entrance examination system. As the highly developed markets for cram 
schools indicates, family culture focusing on facilitating the success of children in school. Specifically, to go beyond 
Aizu’s analysis, the computer literacy certification could be converted to additional points which counted towards 
university entrance exam scores.  
42 In early 2005, Hanaro absorbed Thrunet, but still had difficulty competing with KT, even contemplating receiving 
foreign funds to stay afloat (Fransman 2006:32)  
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(“facility-based”), the government designated KT as the dominant service provider in broadband, 
making it subject to stricter regulations in terms of service and pricing.  
 
Broadband in Japan: An Outgrowth of the Regime Shift 
The Policy Drivers 
 In stark contrast to Korea’s development of broadband, which occurred within the 
“managed competition” regulatory regime, Japan’s broadband markets grew out of a transition in 
its regulatory regime away from “managed competition.” The regime shift was driven by 
political dynamics in which MPT (reorganized in 1999 and renamed Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications – MIC) continually battled NTT, and Japan’s strengthened Cabinet Office 
entered telecom policymaking in a strategic push to develop IT. The shift entailed the 
government giving up many of the policy tools to manage competition, but adding new 
institutions and regulations in a transition from ex ante regulation through licenses and approval, 
towards an ex post mode of regulation relying on a dispute resolution commission and other 
institutions.  
 Japan’s regulatory regime began a gradual transformation in the late 1990s.43 In 1996, the 
battle between MPT and NTT over the divestiture of NTT – whether to break it up partially, 
completely, or not at all – ongoing since the early 1980s, was finally settled. Political 
compromises between a broad range of interested parties had been forged in 1983 and 1990, and 
resolved in 1996. To give a flavor of the complexity of negotiations in these political 
compromises, let it suffice to say that actors with often disagreeing interests included the MPT, 
NTT, the LDP, the Prime Minister (Hashimoto), the NTT labor union, the Social Democratic 
                                                 
43 For gradual transformative institutional change and slow-moving causes and outcomes of change, see Streeck and 
Thelen (2006), Pierson (2003).  
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Party, the Fair Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance, Keidanren, MITI, NTT’s competitor 
carriers, and numerous policy research and deliberation councils.44  
The outcome in 1996 was a surprise agreement between MPT and NTT, which allowed 
NTT to remain a single corporate entity united under a holding company. The tortured nature of 
this political compromise may be inferred by the fact that it required the lifting of the post-war 
ban on holding companies, one of the key tenets of the Allied Occupation in breaking up the 
prewar zaibatsu. Members of the Telecommunications Deliberation Council learned of this 
compromise in the newspapers after they thought they had secured an agreement to completely 
break up NTT.45  
 With the battle over NTT divestiture settled, MPT began to take measures to further 
liberalize the telecom market, through both deregulation and reregulation. In 1997, Japan signed 
the WTO Telecom Agreement, which removed many of the restrictions on inward FDI, 
especially regarding foreign ownership of infrastructure. 46 These new rules took effect in 1998, 
and in the same year MPT relaxed many of its licensing requirements.47 MPT’s deregulation 
measures were accomplished by altering the Telecommunications Business Law, a task made 
easier by broad political support in the form of the “Three Year Action Plan for Deregulation” 
spearheaded by the Cabinet Office in 1994.48  
 Interconnection to NTT’s infrastructure, a necessity for most competitors, since NTT 
controlled the last-one-mile of infrastructure, had been a contentious political issue from the 
                                                 
44 See Bolin (1997), Vogel (2000) for an excellent overviews.  
45 Interview, Toshihiko Hayashi, Professor at the University of the Air, former member of the Telecommunications 
Deliberation Council. (5/2001) Nakamura Ichiya, former MPT official, contends that the sudden compromise was 
the result of MPT shifting its focus from battling NTT to battling NHK, the national broadcaster under its 
jurisdiction. (5/2001) 
46 For details, see Kushida (2006) 
47 For Type I carriers, most price changes and market entry only required notification, whereas they had required 
approval prior to this. See Fuke (2000) for details.  
48 For details, see Suda (2005).  
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introduction of competition in 1985. MPT’s basic stance was to force NTT to lower its 
interconnection rates, and the US periodically got involved in trade initiatives to pressure the 
Japanese government to force NTT to lower its interconnection rates. In 1998, MPT established 
clear rules for interconnection based on a specific formula.49 In 2000, this formula was revised to 
further favor competitors.  
 
 
Market Interactions in Early DSL Markets 
 The interaction between new market entrants attempting to offer DSL, several 
government actors, and a political drive to catch-up in IT not only to the West, but also to Korea, 
drove the next phase of the regime shift. In this phase, the liberalization was strategic, in that the 
government, while reacting to market developments, was clearly pushing for infrastructure and 
service development towards broadband diffusion.  
 In 1999, startup firm Tokyo Metallic, followed by others such as Fusion Communications, 
began offering DSL service. However, in order to do so, they required access to NTT’s switching 
facilities to place their equipment within – a process known as collocation.50 Unlike Korea’s 
Hanaro, these startup firms did not own their infrastructure, since they had not entered local 
telephony markets. Unfortunately for these startup companies, the interconnection rules 
established in 1998 did not cover collocation, and were essentially operating in unregulated 
territory. Therefore, predictably, they were at the mercy of NTT, which delayed access and 
                                                 
49 Kushida (2006), Fuke (2000) pp 43-45, Vogel (2000). The formula was know as LRIC (Long Run Incremental 
Cost), though the US immediately began arguing that Japan’s LRIC calculations were flawed.  
50 DSL sends high frequency signals over conventional copper lines, requiring equipment on both the user’s side (the 
box at home), and inside the carrier’s facilities (NTT switching stations).  
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charged high fees. NTT was interested in continuing its per-minute charge-based ISDN service, 
and wanted to move directly into a proprietary fiber optic service.51  
 A series of government actions rapidly improved the competitive landscape for DSL 
providers. First, in July 2000, noting that Japan lagged behind many other industrialized nations, 
including Korea, in international IT statistics such as Internet penetration, usage, and broadband 
diffusion, the political leadership initiated a policy drive to catch-up in IT. The Cabinet Office, 
newly strengthened in its policymaking capacity, established an “IT Strategy Headquarters,” 
within the Cabinet Office.52 It produced the “e-Japan strategy,” explicitly recognizing Japan’s 
late start in IT, and stipulating a specific timeline to create a market environment providing low 
cost, fast Internet access.53 Later that year, the Cabinet Office passed the “Basic IT Law,” which 
allowed MIC (successor to MPT) a broad framework within which specifics could be determined 
via Ministerial Ordinances.54  
 Second, in October 2000 the FTC made a rare foray into telecom policymaking by 
issuing an unprecedented warning to NTT over its treatment of DSL providers, such as Tokyo 
Metallic and eAccess. At the same time, MIC revised several of its Ministerial Ordinances, 
forcing NTT to clarify the terms it offered collocation, and its methodology for calculating fees. 
                                                 
51 NTT had invested a total of approximately 9 billion dollars in its ISDN infrastructure (Cole 2006, citing Nezu 
2002). Van der Staal, Grassmuck, and Hatta (1995) cite that in 1992, NTT invested 52 billion yen, and 30 billion 
yen in 1993 as it began to slow down its investments.  
52 See Pempel (2006) for details on how the Cabinet Office was strengthened, including increased personnel and 
expanded policymaking capabilities.  
53 See full text at the website of the IT Strategic Headquarters. Cabinet Office. IT Strategic Headquarters. [accessed 
5/23/2006] <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/it/enkaku_e.html> Tilton (2004) argues that the e-Japan 
strategy conforms to the key characteristics of traditional “industrial policy” with a catch-up objective, explicit goal, 
and timeline to achieve specific outcomes.  
54 Ministerial Ordinances are legally binding, but can be decided by the ministry in charge working by iself, with no 
need to coordinate with other ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice to ensure coherence in Japan’s civil law.  
In the government reorganization in 2000, MPT merged with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Management 
and Coordination Agency and was given the unwieldy English title of “the Ministry of Public Management, Home 
Affairs, and Posts and Telecommunications” (MPHPT, Soumusho in Japanese). It made the sensible move to 
simplify its English name to the “Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) in 2004.  In this paper, for 
simplicity, we refer to the successor of MPT as MIC.  
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It also forced NTT to lease out its unused fiber optic infrastructure (known as dark fiber) at low 
prices, as well as access to its local “last-mile” infrastructure (known as “unbundling the local 
loop”).55  
In 2001, MIC established a Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC), located within the 
ministry, but presented as an objective third party dispute mediator that revealed all its 
deliberations proceeding to the public – a shift from the negotiated settlements behind closed 
doors of the past. Among the early cases that the DRC dealt with were DSL providers 
complaining that NTT was slow to act on collocation, in which the DRC ruled against NTT.56  
 In 2003, MIC continued its deregulation by abolishing most of the classification, 
registration, and notification requirements for carriers, going so far as to remove the 
classification of carriers, and officially announcing that it did not limit the scope of carriers’ 
activities.57 MIC in essence announced that it would no longer compartmentalize the sector, and 
gave up many of its policy tools to manage competition.  
 Thus, by 2001, the competitive landscape facing Japanese DSL providers was 
considerably different from that in 1999, when the first firms began offering services. A whole 
set of regulations, backed by a political drive, seemed to back their business. Son Masayoshi, 
ethnically Korean and born in Japan, who founded Softbank in the 1980s, to become a star child 
of Japan’s dot-com era in the late 1990s, took advantage of this new regulatory and market 
environment to its fullest extent.58  
                                                 
55 See Kushida (2006), Fuke (2003) 
56 See website of the DRC at <http://www.soumu.go.jp/hunso/english/index.html> though summaries and minutes in 
Japanese.   
57 Fuke (2000) 
58 For details on Softbank’s activities, see Vogel (2006) pp. 189-193. For a brief overview of Son Masayoshi, see 
Nathan (2004), esp. pp 99-119. 
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 Softbank was an early investor in Yahoo!, and in September 2001, Softbank entered the 
DSL market through its subsidiary, Yahoo!BB. It created a price shock by setting its monthly 
subscription price at about half of the going market rate (2400 yen, approximately 22 dollars at 1 
USD = 110 JPY), and engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign, including giving out $100 
DSL modems for free at train stations. Softbank’s price was the lowest in the world, forcing 
other DSL providers, including NTT regional companies, to lower their prices, and sparking a 
rapid increase in DSL adoption by Japanese.59 Son then delivered a second price shock by 
bundling free IP telephony subscriptions with its DSL service, allowing Softbank subscribers to 
call each other without charge, setting flat rates for long distance calls to non-subscribers, and 
setting international calls at a fraction of the prevailing market rate.60 Softbank was able to set 
this type of pricing because it leased dark fiber from NTT to create its own IP-switched 
backbone.  
 The sudden public interest in IP telephony was supported surprisingly quickly by MIC.  
Without political protest that one might have expected from NTT, which had the most to lose if 
its circuit-switched telephony infrastructure were bypassed completely, MIC assigned a 
dedicated array of numbers to IP telephones (a 050 prefix). It later went on to allow IP 
telephones to obtain telephone numbers within the existing numbering scheme if they met 
quality standards.61 
                                                 
59 MIC officials, among others, were taken by surprise at Son’s aggressive pricing, and many voiced concern that 
Son was waging a dangerous price war, which would make the operation of infrastructure unprofitable to the point 
of threatening future investment into next generation networks. It is not clear that Son would have been allowed to 
wage this type of dramatic price war had the government retained its policy tools of “controlled competition.” 
60 Flat-rate telephony was virtually unheard of in Japan at the time, since NTT’s infrastructure dominated the last-
one-mile, and its interconnection fee structure did not allow competitors utilize conventional telephone networks to 
offer flat-rate services. Son set IP telephony calls to the US at below cost prices, at 8 yen a minute (6-7 cents), 
compared to the 200-300 yen for 3 minutes charged by competitors.  
61 IP denwa demo bangou ga kawaranai riyuu: mittsu no kufuu de soumushou no jouken wo kuria. 2003. Nikkei 
Communications Nov 24: 66-68. Some MIC and former MPT officials have expressed the view that MIC was quick 
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 Softbank’s market strategy in DSL profoundly affected Japan’s FTTH (Fiber-to-the-
Home) service market. Encouraged by industrial policy measures by the government such as 
subsidies, and loans from the Development Bank of Japan, and with extensive investment by 
NTT, Japan had been developing fiber optic infrastructure since the early 1990s. Just as DSL 
markets were taking off, fiber had reached the last-one-mile of most urban areas in Japan. 62  
 NTT had been planning to offer a proprietary service based on an alternative underlying 
technology than the Internet, expecting to combine video, telephony, and data in one line. They 
also expected to charge high fees for this service.63 As Takanori Ida points out, the failure of 
Japan’s government to completely break up NTT gave it the financial strength to engage in an 
extensive nation-wide FTTH buildout.64  However, NTT was preempted by Usen (pronounced 
Yu-sen), a landline music broadcasting company that owned its own telephone pole and fiber 
infrastructure in urban areas. In March 2001, Usen began offering household FTTH services at 
the speed of close to 100 mbp/s (versus 2 to 15 or so for DSL) for approximately 6000 yen, only 
slightly more than double the price of Softbank’s DSL.65 Other competitors began to enter the 
FTTH market at a similar price range, dashing NTT’s hopes of offering a much more expensive, 
proprietary service. FTTH providers also began offering IP telephony, contributing to a rapid rise 
in household IP telephony subscribers.66 The advent of low-priced FTTH services is best 
                                                                                                                                                             
to adopt IP telephony because it was still under the public radar, and that NTT was not in a position to launch a 
major public protest, since nobody foresaw the rapidity with which IP telephony spread.  
62 According to MIC document, by the end of 2001, FTTH networks covered 95% of metropolitan areas (MIC 2003).  
63 For details, see Kushida (2006) 
64 Ida points out that NTT DoCoMo financial success in the booming cellular markets provided NTT regional 
carriers, NTT East and NTT West with de fact subsidies (Ida 2006). 
65 For a wealth of information on details and the variety of FTTH networks to households, apartment buildings, and 
offices, see MIC (2005). 
66 Government numbers show two hundred thousand subscribers by mid-2004. This is not a large number, but given 
that a US investment bank estimated that 6 million users, or 12 percent of households used VoIP at the end of 2003, 
and that it is safe to assume that a large proportion of the 12 million DSL subscribers have DSL modems capable of 
IP telephony, the potential number of users is large. Moreover, Nikkei Communications estimates that by the end of 
2003, over 3 million users out of 4 million plus users had IP-phone enabled DSL modems. "Setogiwa Ni Tatsu Ip 
Denwa Sougo Setsuzoku," Nikkei Communications, February 9 2004.  
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characterized as having its roots in NTT’s traditional pattern of investment, coupled with 
industrial policy from the “controlled competition” regime of the late 1980s to 1990s, but whose 
market dynamics were strongly shaped by the DSL service market.67  
 Citing difficulties in competing in the telephony and broadband markets, NTT announced 
in early 2006 its intent to restructure itself under the existing holding company structure. Its 
attempt is to engage in reform without revising the NTT Law, which would clearly become a 
protracted political battle.  
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the Roles of the Politics, Governments, and Markets  
 Let us now sum up our findings, addressing our initial question of how exactly the 
governments, markets, and politics interacted in the two countries as their broadband markets 
developed rapidly. First, at a market level, we see that in both countries, new entrants offered 
broadband services, delivering a price shock to the Internet access market – especially Hanaro 
for Korea, and Softbank for Japan. The wild success of the newcomers forced the incumbents, 
KT and NTT, to realign their strategies towards deploying DSL. The specifics of the market 
dynamics were not micromanaged by either government. So far, we agree with market-led 
expectations.  
Second, our close study of the policies shows that, in both countries, the governments’ 
approach towards liberalization, an increase in the level of competition, was a conscious strategy 
of both deregulation, a relaxing of rules, as well as reregulation, a strengthening of rules. Here 
we disagree with simple market-led explanations of government-market interactions. Both 
countries set up “managed competition” regimes with similar policy tools to orchestrate 
                                                 
67 See Kushida (2006) for an extended version of this argument.  
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competition into the sector, actively using those tools to incrementally increase and adjust levels 
of competition.  
The Korean government, in allowing Hanaro to enter the local telephony market, did not 
“open” the market per se, but used the existing regulatory framework in introducing a competitor 
to KT. When they deemed the level of competition insufficient in the broadband market, they 
shifted the Internet service provider subsector into a more regulated compartment of the sector in 
order to exercise stronger authority over KT.  
In Japan, the regime shift entailed a significant amount of deregulation as the government 
removed much of the policy framework of “managed competition.” However, it also entailed 
significant reregulation, creating a new set of institutions such as the Dispute Resolution 
Commission to better engage in ex post regulation, and promulgating new policies to facilitate 
local loop unbundling and collocation. The government was also extremely quick to create 
regulations in support of services such as IP telephony which had the potential to significantly 
alter the terms of competition.68  
Thus, we differ from the strongest of state-led expectations by being careful not to 
exaggerate the effect of state policies, but showing how they interacted with market 
developments, which were often startling to government officials in the speed with which they 
developed. However, the broad goals that each of the governments held – to facilitate the 
deployment and diffusion of high-speed Internet access – was firmly entrenched in their policy 
orientations, and both governments actively promoted broadband penetration as the market 
                                                 
68 One might debate whether IP telephony can be considered a “disruptive technology” a la Christensen (2000). 
However, as Weber (2005) points out, Christensen’s definition of disruptive technology is problematic because the 
capacity of incumbent businesses to adapt their business models to the new technology is the critical variable in 
determining whether a technology is disruptive or not. Therefore, if incumbents successfully adapt to the new 
technology, it is not a “disruptive technology.” The definition lies in the business model rather than the technology.   
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developments unfolded. This leads us to conclude that both governments are best characterized 
as being engaged in strategic liberalization.  
We also discovered a significant divergence in the two countries’ regulatory regimes, a 
fact not obvious by reading existing single-country analyses of their respective ICT sectors or 
broadband development. While Korea used its existing policy framework to facilitate strategic 
liberalization, Japan underwent a regime shift that altered institutions and policy tools.  
We found an explanation to this divergence in the politics driving each of the regulatory 
regimes. Beginning with different institutional configurations at the point of origin for the 
telecom sector, different political bargains at major junctures led to distinct sets of political 
dynamics, causing different outcomes in subsequent junctures. Korea’s lead bureaucracy was 
able to establish a strong hierarchical relationship with the incumbent early on, assisted by a 
relatively weak incumbent, and later further strengthened by a politically driven focus on 
empowering the ministry. Japan’s telecom politics involved a more complex struggle over power 
relations between the regulator and a more powerful incumbent, other government bureaucracies 
and actors, and a long chain of negotiated settlements.  
As a building block for future scholarship, this comparative study also raises further 
questions. If we were to consider the telecom policies of Japan and Korea as comparatively 
“successful” in facilitating rapid development of the sector, what differentiates the ICT sector 
from other sectors whose policy and market outcomes cannot be considered as a success (such as 
macroeconomic policy in Japan)? To adequately address this question, we would need a sharper 
focus on differences in policy regimes, markets and politics, across sectors as well as policy 
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functions.69 In other words, we would need to situate the sectors within the broader political 
economic context, and analyze the performance attributes required to facilitate the type of rapid 
broadband growth the two countries experienced. That being said, this study does point to factors 
such as the political impetus strengthening lead bureaucracies, and their intent to facilitate 
competition as a means rather than an end, the availability of technology favoring business 
models of new entrants, and an upsurge of entrepreneurs as the economies strove to adjust to 
new terms of international competition.70  
Second, one might ask how the broadband services subsector fits within the broader 
context of the ICT sector as a whole. Again, this is material for further research. We might 
suggest that the policy tools across landline and wireless networks differ, and that differences in 
the strengths of market players (NTT “family” firms in Japan versus the chaebol in Korea) 
relatively to governmental actors may create a somewhat different set of political and market 
dynamics. Governments may have stronger policy tools on the one hand, but especially in the 
case of Korea, the chaebol would be much more powerful market players than KT. Deriving a 
fuller picture of the political dynamics in telecom policymaking for each country would require 
comparing our findings from this paper to those of the wireless subsector as well.  
 
Implications: A New Playground for Experimentation  
 Let us conclude by noting that the development of high-speed network broadband 
environments in Japan and Korea has important implications for innovation and value-creation in 
the two countries, as well as international competition in ICT. The process of lead users putting 
                                                 
69 Vogel and Zysman (2002) point out that different national governance structures are particularly suitable for not 
only particular sectors, but particular functions as well. Kitchelt (1991) notes the importance of taking this type of 
analysis to the sectoral level as well.  
70 For the change in terms of competition embedded in the digital production paradigm, and national asjustments, 
see various chapters in Zysman and Newman ed., (2006).  
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technologies to new uses was an essential component of the IT revolution which originated in the 
US.71 The US, which was a playground for experimentation and innovation in the initial phase of 
the Internet revolution, has fallen behind many other countries in terms of network speed and 
penetration.72 In the next round of competition, Japan and Korea’s new high-speed, broadband 
environments promise to offer new “playgrounds” for experimentation and innovation. 
                                                 
71 Cohen et al. (2000) 
72 Firms such as Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo, Amazon, Google, and eBay faced the most advanced and sophisticated 
domestic market in terms of PC penetration, Internet usage, etc. 
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Appendix: Expectations for Market-led and State-led perspective of development applied 
to broadband. 
First, in what we dub a market-led explanation, we would expect that some combination 
of new technology, new entrants, new corporate strategies, and the governments’ retreat from 
market-distorting regulations produced a “market-friendly” environment from which broadband 
services developed rapidly. One might expect a spectrum of positions with respect to the actual 
relationship between governments and markets, even within the market-led perspective. At one 
end, one could follow the OECD in arguing that Korea successfully deregulated its telecom 
sector, and Japan created a better regulatory environment for market competition.73  At the other 
extreme, one could invoke the arguments about globalization undermining government capacity 
to manage markets altogether – that factors such as increased trade, financial flows, and a 
dominance of neo-liberal ideology interconnected in new ways via information technology 
resulted in inevitable pressures on national modes of regulation, if not the conception the nation-
state itself in a “flat” world. 74 One might envision how Korea’s financial crisis and Japan’s 
prolonged stagnation robbed them of rationale and legitimacy for continued intervention in 
various markets, or that the crisis and stagnation were the culminations of paralyzed states.75 In 
this scenario, we would expect a new set of dynamic market forces as a result of the 
                                                 
73 OECD 1999 (Korea), OECD 2000 (Japan). 
74 Friedman (2005) contends that the competitive landscape across the world has been “flattened,” or set on an even 
playing ground. Other notable works include; Strange (1996) who argues that states have ceded much of their 
domain to non-state actors; Milner and Keohane (1996) bring into question whether Japanese and Korean-style 
government-led altering of comparative advantage (at least, in the short term) can persist in the face of capital 
mobility; Cerny (1995) argues that the states’ ability to provide public goods, such as infrastructure, in addition to 
other factors including national identity, will be challenged, though he does mention in passing that policymakers 
will attempt to reinvent the state; Ohmae (1995) argues that the state is no longer the dominant actor nor business 
unit in the world; and Castells (1996) provides a vision of networks rather than states as the locus of dominant 
functions and processes.  
75. For example, for Korea, Weiss (1998) argues that by the crisis, Korea had lost much of its state capacity, and 
Woo-Cumings (1999b) argues that the Korean developmental strategy led it to a bind in that it was wedded to large 
business, but politically paralyzed to enact bureaucrat-led reform. For example, for Japan, Katz (1998) argues that 
Japan’s state, which had been development, became consumed by clientilistic interests over time, Castells (1998) 
argues that the very success of the Japanese developmental project led to forces thrusting it into crisis, and Van 
Wolfren (1990) finds no real center to the Japanese state.  
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governments’ retreat from active attempts to manage their telecom sectors. It would be these new 
sets of market dynamics conducive to new entrants and price-based competition that yielded low 
service prices, which in turn drove rapid population penetration.76   
Second, what we call a government-led expectation would lead us to expect that the 
Japanese and Korean governments intervened quite heavily in the telecom markets, strategically 
altering investment profiles to foster rapid broadband diffusion.77 On the one hand, one could 
point to the nature of the telecom sector, which involves incumbent firms requiring strong 
regulation to foster competition, significant network investments in which private firms might be 
unwilling to invest, and existing institutions and histories of heavy government intervention and 
lead bureaucracies in charge of managing the sector. One might draw from broader scholarship 
contending that the salience of national governments persists in the face of globalization, 
technological shifts, and economic downturns  -- perhaps even by acquiring new goals and tools 
along the way.78 
                                                 
76 This logic tends to be more prominent in analyses of Korea. For example, see OECD (2000), Tcha, et al. (2000), 
Lee (2002), Choudrie and Lee (2004). 
77 This logic is found in several analyses of Korea’s broadband development, including Fackler (2006), Frieden 
(2005), Lee and Olmsted (2004), Lee et al. (2003), Tcha et al (2000), Choudrie and Lee (2004) for Korea. For 
Japan’s broadband development, Bleha (2005), and Tilton (2004) make strong arguments along this vein.  
78 Weiss (1998), Levy (2006)  
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